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Abstract This essay provides an introduction and overview for a symposium on
macroeconomic policy, international finance and banking in Japan. The sympo-
sium consists of thirteen papers. Nine of the papers including most of those on
macroeconomic policy and international finance appear in this issue. The re-
maining papers including one on macroeconomic relations within the Asia-Pacific
region and three on Japan’s banking system will appear in a special section of the
next issue of this journal.
1 Introduction
During the past 50 years no major, industrialized, high-income country has suffered
a more remarkable reversal of economic fortune than has Japan since 1989. Japan’s
potential per capita real rate of GDP growth which was viewed as 4% during the
1980s is now seen as a little better than 1–1/2% (OECD 2005). The Bank of Japan
once seen as sure footed model for central banks for having insulated Japan from
economic impact of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the 1987 equity markets
meltdown is now viewed as clumsy (Ito 1992; Ahearne et al. 2002). In the most
stunning reversal of perception of all, Japan’s banks once viewed as skilled
practitioners of relationship banking are widely viewed today as artifacts of by-
gone era of protective regulation. Their future role as financial intermediaries in the
Japan of tomorrow remains unclear.
The papers in this Symposium seek to shed new light on this reversal of
Japan’s economic fortunes even as they also make new proposals to speed
Japan’s recovery.1
G. R. Saxonhouse (*) . R. M. Stern
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA
1 These papers were originally presented at a pre-conference meeting in Tokyo in May 2004 and
in a conference at the University of Michigan in October 2004. The program of research was
sponsored jointly by the University of Michigan and the Hitotsubashi University. Funding was
provided by the Japan Foundation, Center for Global Partnership, the Economic and Social
Research Institute, Cabinet Office, Japan, the Center for Japanese Studies of the University of
Michigan, and the 21st Century COE Program, Research Unit for Statistical Analysis in the
Social Sciences, Hitotsubashi University.
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2 Macroeconomic policy
2.1 The disconnect between professional economists and policy-making in Japan
In their paper, “The Role of Preconceived Ideas in Macroeconomic Policy: Japan’s
Experience in Two deflationary Periods,” Koichi Hamada and Asahi Noguchi take
pains to point out that the past 15 years is not the only time in the past 100 years that
Japan has suffered severe peace-time economic difficulty. The years immediately
after the First World War and the 1920s were also difficult times for Japan. Hamada
and Noguchi see a link between the two periods. In both periods policy makers and
the public had a basic misunderstanding of the source of the problems facing the
Japanese economy and the steps needed to promote Japan’s recovery. Sadly, in
each case, many professional economists correctly diagnosed Japan’s situation, but
were unable to influence the policy process.
In the 1920s, Japan’s policy makers, Japan’s newspapers, the Japanese public,
and even Japan’s academic economists believed that a return to the gold standard at
the pre-World War I parity would restore strength to the economy. Only private
sector economists, such as Kamekichi Takahashi and Tanzan Ishibashi, fully
appreciated the costs Japan might face if it attempted the deflation of prices and
wages required for a return to the pre-war regime. It was only after Japan expe-
rienced much of these costs that policy makers were willing to change course.
According to Hamada and Noguchi, the roles policy makers, newspapers and
professional economists have played in the most recent policy debate on deflation
is very similar to what occurred 80 years ago. Once again, policy makers,
newspapers and the public were for many years very tolerant of deflation. Deflation
was seen as a necessary by-product of structural adjustment. For many, the more
deflation, the more evidence that progress was being made on the road to economic
recovery. Once again, economists, this time among them many academic econ-
omists, stood apart from this consensus. Viewing deflation as a monetary phe-
nomenon, they called on the Bank of Japan to adopt a highly expansionary
monetary policy so that Japan’s economic recovery might commence. As in 1920s,
in Hamada’s and Noguchi’s view it was only after Japan had experienced a long
period of unnecessary stagnation that both the policy makers and the public
changed their outlook and expansionary monetary policy commenced.
Hamada and Noguchi are at pains to emphasize that it was not self-interest that
caused policy makers and the press to champion diagnoses and policies that they
later learned were wrong. Rather, economists had difficulty in mobilizing support
for steps that ultimately proved to be entirely correct. It is possible that changes in
the government’s economic policy-making institutions (the creation of the Council
of Economic and Financial Policy in the Cabinet Office in 2001) that make it easier
for academic economists to participate in the critical discussions that shape policy
may make this less a problem in the future.
2.2 Price expectations and monetary policy
Changing price expectations are one channel through which an expansionary
monetary policy belatedly promoted by the Bank of Japan can fight deflation.
Despite its potential importance, however, there has been relatively little research
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in Japan on the determinants of price expectations. Hori and Shimizutani in their
paper, “Price Expectations of Japanese Household: Evidence from Original Survey
Data” take advantage of an original household-level data set to examine the factors
that affect price expectations, and explore how changes in price expectations can
affect household consumption. Their study confirms that deflationary expectations
discourage household consumption. At the same time, it seems clear that the Bank
of Japan’s repeated announcements of an easing of monetary policy did little to
change household price expectations. Only 5% to 10% of the households in the
Kokumin Seikatsu Monitor data set revised upwards their price expectations in
response. This certainly suggests that the expansionary Japanese monetary policy
advocated by Hamada and Noguchi labors under special handicaps.
2.3 A role for fiscal policy?
Hamada and Noguchi stress that there is a consensus among Japanese economists
that monetary policy is the key to Japanese recovery. While, as will be seen, there
are certainly exceptions to this view in Japan, in the United States quite a number of
influential economists have taken the position that expansionary fiscal policy also
has a role to play (Kuttner and Posen 2001; Hubbard 2002; Borda and Weinstein
2004). Ihori and Nakamoto in “Japan’s Fiscal Policy and Fiscal Reconstruction”
take exception to this view. Extending their earlier VAR analysis with more recent
data, they find no evidence that an increase in public investment or a tax cut has
much of expansionary impact.2 Indeed, in the 1990s some crowding out of a
private investment is observed. In addition, there seems to be some evidence, given
Japan’s massive deficit and large outstanding public debt, that fiscal tightening,
rather than undermining aggregate demand, led to an increase in consumption,
though the magnitude is small.
While Ihori and Nakazato reject any role for expansionary fiscal policy, unlike
Hamada and Noguchi, they do see deregulation and structural adjustment, and with
it decline in prices in particular goods and services, as capable of promoting
Japanese recovery. Indeed, they find deregulation capable of having a substantially
greater macroeconomic impact than fiscal policy.
2.4 Gesell Taxes and Eisler Taxes
An expansionary monetary policy may be necessary to promote the Japanese
recovery, but it is possible such policies may not be sufficient. In the presence of
deflation, the inability to push nominal interest rates below zero may leave real
interest rates too high at this stage of Japan’s business cycle to call forth the rate of
investment required to assure a return of Japan to full employment. Mitsuhiro
Fukao in “The Effects of ‘Gesell’ (Currency) Taxes in Promoting Japan’s Economy”
proposes a number of measures to cope with this problem. In particular, he argues
that the Bank of Japan should raise its price level target from zero to 1.4% per annum
as measured by the core consumer price index with a margin of error of plus or minus
2 See Saxonhouse and Stern (2003) for a comparison of Kuttner and Posen (2000) with Ihori
et al. (2003).
Reversal of fortune: Macroeconomic policy, international finance, and banking in Japan 93
1% over a three-year horizon. To achieve this end, the Bank of Japan should buy
large amount of market-indexed ETFs (Exchange Traded Funds) and market-
indexed REITs (Real Estate Investment Trusts). If this measure is not effective, the
government should break the nominal interest rate floor by levying a tax on all
government guaranteed financial assets including currency.
Willem Buiter provides a somewhat different view in “Overcoming the Zero
Bound on Nominal Interest Rate: Gesell’s Currency Carry Tax vs. Eisler’s Parallel
Virtual Currency.”He notes that despite the zero lower bound on the short-term rate
in Japan having become a binding constraint, conventional monetary policy in the
form of generalized open-market purchases of government securities of all
maturities has not been pushed to the limit where all outstanding government debt
and all current and future government deficits are or are confidently expected to be
monetized. As long as the risk-free nominal interest on financial instruments of any
maturity remains positive, a currency tax, in Buiter’s view is unwarranted.
Unlike Buiter, Fukao does not think that the massive open-market purchases of
long-term bonds is feasible. If the Bank of Japan holds a massive amount of long-
term JGBs when long-time interest rates rise it will experience a very large capital
loss. At the very time it is experiencing this loss, it will also be necessary for it to
raise short-term interest rates by mopping up excess liquidity. Fukao believes that
before it will be able to accomplish this completely the Bank of Japan will run out
of assets to sell. If it is to continue with its open-market operation it will be forced
to issue interest-bearing promissory notes. According to Fukao, this will result in
the Bank of Japan being forced to turn to the government for a subsidy.
In contrast, not only does Buiter feel charging negative interest on money is
unnecessary, he worries that it will be administratively difficult. The original
proposal made by Silvio Gesell that currency be stamped to indicate that it is
current on interest rates is feasible, but Buiter feels it will be costly and intrusive,
and, therefore, should only be used as a last resort. Buiter notes that a proposal
made by Robert Eisler in 1932 overcomes the problems of both cost and in-
trusiveness by unbundling the medium of exchange/means of payments function
from the numeraire function of money through the creation of a parallel, virtual
money. By controlling the exchange rate between the means of payment and the
numeraire, specifically by appreciating the value of the currency in terms of the
numeraire, monetary authorities such as the Bank of Japan, can achieve a negative
interest rate on the numeraire even though the interest rate on currency remains
constrained by the lower bound.
Eisler’s proposal raises the fundamental issue about who chooses or what
determines the numeraire used in private wage and price contracts. According to
Buiter, Eisler’s implicit assumption that monetary authorities can credibly deter-
mine the numeraire used in private wage and price contracts is shaky both a priori
and empirically. What might otherwise be a neat solution to a difficult problem
remains suspect.
2.5 Supply shocks and Japanese deflation
As noted, Hamada and Noguchi, in their paper for this Symposium, dismiss the role
of positive supply shocks as a cause of Japan’s deflation. Indeed, they attribute the
long delay in Japan’s recovery to the mistaken view that Japan’s deflation reflects
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an acceleration of technological progress. In his contribution to this Symposium,
“Good Deflation/Bad Deflation and Japanese Economic Recovery,” Saxonhouse,
following Bordo et al. (2004), notes that, whatever the current situation in Japan,
economic history certainly suggests that technological progress can go hand in
hand with general deflation. Conducting a VAR analysis using very detailed in-
formation about the components of Japan’s consumer price index, Saxonhouse
finds that short-run shocks to Japan’s relative price structure persist in the long run.
Given this finding, he concludes that such shocks are real in origin and reflect
technological change. As no effort has yet been completed to show the full extent to
which technological change is driving short-run relative price change in Japan
compared with other factors, and the full extent to which relative price changes are
driving aggregate price change compared with other factors, the policy impli-
cations of Saxonhouse’s findings are unclear. Nevertheless, they may provide some
support for Ihori’s and Nakamoto’s view on the relationship between deregulation
and macroeconomic improvement. What is clear, however, is that it is a mistake to
dismiss out of hand the possibility that technological shocks are playing an im-
portant role among other forces in Japan’s current deflation.
3 Macroeconomic policy and the exchange rate
3.1 Intervention policy and exchange rate changes
In the debate over whether non-standard monetary policies, such as those discussed
by Mitsuhiro Fukao and Buiter are needed, it is sometimes forgotten that
unsterilized exchange rate intervention remains a monetary tool that can be used to
stimulate the Japanese economy (Svensson 2001, 2003). Takatoshi Ito’s paper,
“Interventions and Japanese Economic Recovery” and Rasmus Fatum’s and
Michael Hutchison’s paper, “Foreign Exchange Rate Intervention and Monetary
Policy in Japan, 2003–04,” both examine the rationale behind the massive increase
in foreign exchange market intervention in 2003–2004 and evaluate its effective-
ness in promoting an external value of the yen and a change in the money supply
capable of supporting Japanese economic recovery. Using different approaches,
both papers document the dramatic change in intervention that commenced in
Japan in January 2003 and continued until March 2003. During these 14 months
3.5 trillion yen (7% of GDP) in interventions were conducted. Unlike interventions
conducted in the preceding six years when Eisuke Sakakibara and Haruhiko
Kuroda were Vice Ministers for International Finance at the Ministry of Finance,
these interventions were both frequent and unannounced. While agreeing on the
outline of the changes in policy, Ito and Fatum-Hutchinson disagree to as to
whether intervention policy was effective in preventing the yen appreciation that a
fragile Japanese economy battling deflation could ill afford. Ito estimates a reaction
function explaining Japanese intervention. He finds that the unannounced in-
terventions in 2003–2004 might have been larger because they were not as
effective yen-for-yen as the announced intervention during the Sakakibara-Kuroda
period. Nevertheless, by selling 3.5 trillion yen Ito finds that the Japanese
authorities achieved a yen–dollar range from 105 to 115 in Spring–Summer 2004,
instead of the range 90 to 100 that he feels would otherwise have prevailed. In other
words, Ito finds that a 13.3% depreciation was achieved by “leaning against” the
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market when the yen was appreciating, and “leaning in” the market when the yen
was depreciating.
While agreeing with Ito that intervention was effective during the Sakakibara-
Kuroda period, Fatum and Hutchison find the massive interventions of 2003 in-
effective and the massive interventions of early 2004 actually pushing the yen in
the wrong direction. Fatum and Hutchison suggest that other studies of exchange
rate intervention by Japanese monetary authorities have found different results
possibly because they are contaminated by sample selection bias. Intervention
typically occurs during periods of abnormal exchange rate movements and not
when normal exchange rate market conditions prevail. To get around this problem
they match-up cases where economic circumstances were in every regard the same
except that in one case intervention occurred and in the other it did not. It is from an
analysis of these cases that Fatum and Hutchison draw their conclusions about the
effectiveness of intervention policy.
Fatum and Hutchison also explore the hypothesis that the reduced effectiveness
of the intervention over the 2003–2004 period compared with the Sakakibara-
Kuroda period is related to the degree of sterilization. Did increased sterilization
mean a decline in the effectiveness of intervention? Interventions carried out by the
Bank of Japan on behalf of the Ministry of Finance are automatically sterilized
since the Ministry of Finance must first raise the necessary funds for foreign
exchange purchases by selling yen-denominated bills in the domestic market. The
real question is what action, if any, does the Bank of Japan take to unsterilize the
intervention? Fatum and Hutchison find that the Bank of Japan has not allowed
Ministry of Finance interventions to influence the day-to-day conduct of monetary
policy. In addition, they find no evidence that the Bank of Japan responded to
intervention action by the Ministry of Finance in 2003–2004 by increasing base
money at a rate faster than it might otherwise have done. Indeed, cumulative
foreign currency purchases by the Ministry of Finance were more than twice as
large as the increases in base money engineered by the Bank of Japan. The Bank of
Japan on its own was attempting to stimulate the economy in 2003–2004 through
rapid base-money growth, but this does not seem to have been influenced by the
exchange rate intervention policy of the Ministry of Finance. Much of this
intervention remained sterilized, in Fatum’s and Hutchinson’s view, perhaps
accounting for its lack of effectiveness.
3.2 Exchange rate change and economic performance
Unlike Ito, Ronald McKinnon rejects the use of exchange rate change as a tool for
economic adjustment. In “Exchange Rate or Wage Changes in International
Adjustment? Japan and China versus the United States,” he notes American-spon-
sored exchange rate adjustment has wreaked havoc with the Japanese economy in
the past, and will do so again in China and Japan today if they succumb today to US
pressure. McKinnon believes US government officials are mistaken if they believe
exchange rate adjustment will significantly alter international economic imbal-
ances. A yen or renminbi appreciation will raise the price of Japanese or Chinese
goods and services relative to foreign goods and services, discouraging their pur-
chases, but the appreciation also has a deflationary impact because of the loss in
value of the dollar assets each of these countries hold. As a result, the net impact of
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an appreciation is indeterminant. In McKinnon’s view the history of US–Japanese
economic relations over the past 30 years makes very clear that yen appreciation
did not have any lasting impact on the structural surplus in Japan’s international
accounts. At the same time, this appreciation imposed a deflationary bias on
monetary policy ultimately pushing Japan into a liquidity trap from which it has yet
to emerge. New demands emanating from the United States that Japan further
appreciate the yen even while it is continuing to experience deflation make little
sense to McKinnon. Moreover, he fears that intense US pressure now to break of
the peg between the renminbi and the dollar will push China down the same
unhappy path that Japan has gone.
In preference to using exchange rate changes to mitigate international economic
imbalances, McKinnon believes that not only the renminbi but all currencies in
East Asia, including the yen, should be pegged to the dollar. If each country’s
monetary policy permits nominal wage growth to reflect increases in productivity,
international adjustment will take care of itself far more readily than is the case
under today’s ad hoc regime.
3.3 Monetary regimes and stabilization policy
While McKinnon argues for the superiority of the dollar peg system on medium
and long-term grounds, the model constructed by Koichi Kamada and Izumi
Takagawa in their paper, “Deepening Interdependence in the Asian-Pacific Region:
An Empirical Study Using a Macro-Econometric Model” is able to test a dollar peg
system versus other regimes over shorter-time horizons. Insofar as coping with
economic crises are concerned, Kamada and Takagawa find that a currency-basket
regime is clearly superior to both the dollar-peg system advocated by McKinnon as
well as the current ad hoc regime. This is true for China and Japan, as well as for
most other countries in East Asia. At least on short-run stabilization policy
grounds, a regime where all countries peg their currencies to the dollar is worse for
many countries in East Asia, not only compared to a regime where all countries peg
to a currency basket, but also to the present regime.
4 Banking, structural adjustment and Japanese economic performance
4.1 Government policy and the banking system
Even if the Bank of Japan had pursued a highly expansionary money policy in the
mid and late 1990s it is by no means that a recovery of the Japanese economy
would have ensued. By that time the balance sheets of Japanese banks had de-
teriorated to such an extent that the conventional monetary transmission system
had broken down (Bernanke 2000). If banks will not lend simply increasing a
supply of base money will do little to stimulate the economy. In his paper, “Reform
of the Japanese Banking System,” Kawai investigates how Japanese banks ceased
to be effective financial intermediaries and the role that government policy has
played in the banking sector’s distress and slow recovery.
The asset-price bubble in the late 1980s and its subsequent collapse were
largely responsible for the emergence of non-performing loans (NPLs) and the
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banking sector problem. Nevertheless, the situation was exacerbated, Kawai
argues, by the absence of a tradition of assessing and pricing the risks of lending to
particular borrowers. This was an important factor in the over-extension of col-
lateral-based but risky loans. And the entire problem was made even worse by the
banks operating within a very weak prudential and supervisory framework.
Kawai finds that the absence of a comprehensive strategy addressing the
banking sector problem when it first emerged was clearly a mistake that allowed a
systemic banking crisis to emerge in 1997–1998 to be followed by a large output
loss during 1998–2002. Japan’s financial authorities underestimated the nature and
seriousness of the problem, had unwarranted expectations of renewed growth that
they hoped would restore asset values and bank balance sheets, and continued
fiscal expansion to support aggregate demand allowing insolvent banks to survive
thereby delaying resolution of the problem.
The 1997–1998 crisis did prompt the government to take more aggressive and
decisive measures. Kawai notes that there has been some progress on banking
sector restructuring through the closing or temporary nationalization of non-viable
banks, tighter loan classification and loan provisioning, and the acceleration of
NPL disposal. The worst may be over, but there remain significant risks con-
centrated in regional and smaller banks that are vulnerable to weak local condi-
tions, persistent deflation, and increases in the long-term interest rate.
4.2 What role for Japan’s Banks
The regulatory framework that was in place for much of the second half of the last
century in Japan put the banking system at the center of resource allocation. Kyoji
Fukao, Kiyohiko G. Nishimura, Qing-Yuan Sui and Masayo Tomiyama in their
paper “Japanese Bank Monitoring Activities and the Performance of Borrower
Firms 1981–1996” attempt to assess empirically the contributions made by
Japanese banks. They find that after 1981, following widespread organizational
changes, both the resources devoted to and the quality of what bank monitoring
was done declined. While there remained a positive association between bank
monitoring and firm profitability, this was mostly due to the banks choosing the
most profitable loan applicants rather than because banks in any significant way
provided advice that enhanced the profitability of their borrowers. It is a measure of
the current low esteem in which banks are held that even the result that they are
able to successfully screen loan applicants seems surprising and is at variance with
the conclusions drawn by Kawai. Even so, if Japanese banks are to play an
important role in Japan’s economy in the future they will in all likelihood need to
have a monitoring function that does provide value-added to their borrowers.
This last point is underlined by the results in the paper by Alan Ahearne and
Naoki Shinada, “Zombie Firms and Economic Stagnation in Japan”. Zombie firms
are debt-ridden companies that, despite their dismal performance, continue to re-
ceive financial support from borrowers who at some earlier time viewed them as
safe, profitable borrowers. Measured productivity growth of these firms has tended
to be well below the average for the rest of the economy, or even negative, putting
a significant drag on the productivity performance of the Japanese economy as
a whole. Worse, Ahearne and Shinada find that in the construction, wholesale,
and retailing sectors where there are large concentrations of zombie firms the
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reallocation of resources is going perversely from productive to unproductive
firms. The continuing support of these zombie firms by Japan’s banks is an
important factor in the banking sector’s poor performance. Ahearne and Shinada
argue that banks should be provided with incentives to withdraw their support,
and force firms to meaningfully restructure or, in some cases, to close.
5 Some difficulties posed by recovery
Japan is once again in the midst of a fragile recovery as it has been on at least in
five other occasions in the past 15 years. This latest recovery is somewhat different
from some of those in the recent past because, notwithstanding continuing
deflation, it is being driven by domestic consumption and non-residential private
investment, and not only by exports. Even so, Japan’s sustained escape from
economic stagnation is fraught with difficulties. As the papers in this Symposium
discuss in detail macroeconomic policy, international finance, and the banking
system, individually and together, pose major problems for the future of Japan’s
economy.
The very large volume of outstanding government debt as a proportion of GDP
makes it likely that as the Japanese economy attempts a sustained recovery, long-
term interest rates on government debt will rise. The most immediate impact of this
rise in interest rates will be on the Japanese banking system’s balance sheet.
Japanese banks have returned to profitability and the nominal value of their
outstanding NPLs is declining. Nevertheless, there continues to be a contraction in
bank lending (OECD 2005). In consequence, Japanese government debt continues
to be an important part of the banking sector’s assets. As noted by both Kawai and
Mitsuhiro Fukao, a rise in interest rates will impose a significant capital loss on the
Japanese banking system. What has been gained after long effort from the writing
off of NPLs, the unraveling of cross-holding equity relationships between borrower
and lender, and the infusion of government capital may be quickly lost.3
The likely rise in long-term interest rates will do more than just pose difficulties
for the banking system. Because of the government’s very large outstanding debt,
the rise in rates not only reflects, but also reinforces public concern about the
sustainability of Japan’s fiscal position. At the very time that new government
expenditures might be needed to shore up the banking system, however, the im-
peratives of public finance require, as Ihori observes, a continuing paring of ex-
penditures and a raising of revenues.
The likely rise in interest rates will complicate Japan’s recovery on yet a third
front. Rising rates in Japan will put still further pressure on the yen to appreciate. If
Ito is correct, the Ministry of Finance has the tools to cope with this problem, but
McKinnon suggests that in the face of American counter-pressure, the political will
to intervene cannot always be counted upon. Fatum’s and Hutchison’s findings,
however, imply that even if the political will is there a good outcome is not assured.
The difficulties just outlined can be mitigated by continued, credible gov-
ernment steps towards fiscal consolidation that aims, as Ihori suggests, at the
3 Saxonhouse and Stern (2003) discuss how the US Treasury and the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System dealt with a similar problem in the 1940s and what lessons Japan might
learn from this experience.
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elimination of Japan’s primary government deficit, and the creation of a modest
surplus. In an environment of less than robust aggregate demand must be skillfully
managed lest Japan once again slip into a recession.4
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